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We realize that the open and confidential character of psychotherapeutic dialogue encourages patients to express threats of violence, few of which are ever executed. Certainly a therapist should not be encouraged routinely to reveal such threats; such disclosures could seriously disrupt the patient's relationship with his therapist and with the persons threatened. To the contrary, the therapist's obligations to his patient require that he not disclose a confidence unless such disclosure is necessary to avert danger to others, and even then that he do so discreetly, and in a fashion that would preserve the privacy of his patient to the fullest extent compatible with the prevention of the threatened danger. (See Fleming & Maximov, The Patient or His Victim: The Therapist's Dilemma (1974) 62 Cal.L.Rev. 1025, 1065-1066.) fn. 14
Plaintiffs' complaints imply that Moore acquiesced in Powelson's countermand of Moore's confinement recommendation. Such acquiescence [17 Cal. 3d 449] is functionally equivalent to determining not to seek Poddar's confinement and thus merits protection under section 856. At this stage we are unaware, of course, precisely how Moore responded to Powelson's actions; he may have debated the confinement issue with Powelson, for example, or taken no initiative whatsoever, perhaps because he respected Powelson's judgment, feared for his future at the hospital, or simply recognized that the proverbial handwriting was on the wall. None of these possibilities constitutes, however, the type of careless or wrongful behavior subsequent to a decision respecting confinement which is stripped of protection by the exception in section 856. fn. 23 Rather, each is in the nature of a decision not to continue to press for Poddar's confinement. No language in plaintiffs' original or amended complaints suggests that Moore determined to fight Powelson, but failed successfully to do so, due to negligent or otherwise wrongful acts or omissions. Under the circumstances, we conclude that plaintiffs' second amended complaints allege facts which trigger immunity for Dr. Moore under section 856. fn. 24
Second, the guarantee of confidentiality is essential in eliciting the full disclosure necessary for effective treatment. (In re Lifschutz, supra, 2 Cal. 3d 415, 431; Taylor v. United States (D.C.Cir. 1955) 222 F.2d 398, 401 [95 App.D.C. 373]; Goldstein & Katz, supra, 36 Conn.Bar J. 175, 178; Heller, Some Comments to Lawyers on the Practice of Psychiatry (1957) 30 Temp.L.Q. 401; Guttmacher & Weihofen, Privileged Communications Between Psychiatrist and Patient (1952) 28 Ind.L.J.32, 34.) fn. 3 The psychiatric patient approaches treatment with conscious and unconscious inhibitions against revealing his innermost thoughts. \"Every person, however well-motivated, has to overcome resistances to therapeutic exploration. These resistances seek support from every possible source and the possibility of disclosure would easily be employed in the service of resistance.\" (Goldstein & Katz, supra, 36 Conn.Bar J. 175, 179; see also, 118 Am.J.Psych. 734, 735.) Until a patient can trust his psychiatrist not to violate their confidential relationship, \"the unconscious psychological control mechanism of repression will prevent the recall of past experiences.\" (Butler, Psychotherapy and Griswold: Is Confidentiality a Privilege or a Right (1971) 3 Conn.L.Rev. 599, 604.)
Third, even if the patient fully discloses his thoughts, assurance that the confidential relationship will not be breached is necessary to [17 Cal. 3d 460] maintain his trust in his psychiatrist -- the very means by which treatment is effected. \"[T]he essence of much psychotherapy is the contribution of trust in the external world and ultimately in the self, modelled upon the trusting relationship established during therapy.\" (Dawidoff, The Malpractice of Psychiatrists, 1966 Duke L.J. 696, 704.) Patients will be helped only if they can form a trusting relationship with the psychiatrist. (Id., at p. 704, fn. 34; Burham, Separation Anxiety (1965) 13 Arch.Gen.Psych. 346, 356; Heller, supra, 30 Temp.L.Q. 401, 406.) All authorities appear to agree that if the trust relationship cannot be developed because of collusive communication between the psychiatrist and others, treatment will be frustrated. (See, e.g., Slovenko (1973) Psychiatry and Law, p. 61; Cross, Privileged Communications Between Participants in Group Psychotherapy (1970) Law & Soc. Order, 191, 199; Hollender, The Psychiatrist and the Release of Patient Information (1960) 116 Am.J.Psych. 828, 829.) 153554b96e
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